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Abstract
Growing demand for cropland products has placed intense pressure on the ability of land
resources to support nature, straining public budgets to purchase environmental goods. Fixing
overall agricultural output, two policy options are whether to promote more extensive and nature
friendly farming practices or to produce intensively on some land and leave the rest wild.
Microeconomic models of the topic have not accommodated widely recognized complementary
spatial externalities in providing ecological services. This article does so, identifying also a third
policy possibility. This is that environmental services can follow a smoothly varying spatial path
characterized by harmonic functions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Rising real incomes, an expanding global population and biofuel policies have increased
demand for land under crops over the first decade of the 21st century (Mitchell, 2008). With a
marked expansion of cropland and higher land rental rates, governments are posed with the
problem of how best to provide a wide variety of environmental services when the price of
obtaining these has increased.1 A widely noted feature of these services is that spatial contiguity
matters, and so the spatial arrangement of targeted land matters.
Services at issue include carbon sequestration where output is a global public good and
spatial externalities are clearly secondary. They also include green space for outdoor amenities,
flora and fauna habitat, as well as riparian buffer zones. For riparian buffer zones to encourage
nature, reduce erosion, and filter chemical runoff, spatial effects likely involve local substitution.
This is because service provision by neighboring lands may be almost as effective. Substitution
effects are also likely when woodland is intended to control rainwater flow and so prevent
flooding. In other cases, local complementarity is likely, as with contiguity in scenery or with
existence value for an unspoiled ecosystem. Spatial fragmentation is especially harmful for
larger plant and animal species, where a reduction in their presence can greatly alter the
presence, extent, and behavior of other organisms, including the risk of species invasion; see for
example Terborgh et al. (2001) or Damschen et al. (2006).
In the presence of such spatial spillovers, there has been much debate on how to construct
public policy to most efficiently provide ecological public goods. One way of doing so is to buy
down farmer profit opportunities through requiring investments that increase environmental
outputs or through purchasing restrictions on agricultural practices. In a widely cited paper,
Green et al. (2005) developed on a suggestion in Waggoner (1995) that it may be optimal to load
1 For example, row cropland cash rent increased by about 29% between 2006 and 2008 (Edwards
and Smith, 2008).
2the buy downs on one set of acres, concentrating agricultural production on the remaining acres.
This is the intensification option.
Or it may be optimal to spread the buy downs across all acres so that all acres provide
roughly similar bundles of agricultural production and environmental services. This is the
extensification option. Which is optimal, they suggest, depends on the relationship between
agricultural losses and environmental services. If the marginal reduction in environmental
services due to an increase in agricultural outputs declines with an increase in these outputs (is
convex) then intensification is the better policy. If the relation is concave, then extensification is
the better policy. Their model does not account for spatial spillovers. The intensification policy
suggestion is controversial; see Jordan et al. (2007), De Fries et al. (2007), or Ceotto (2008). See
Tichit et al. (2007), Scherr and McNeeley (2008), or Fischer et al. (2008) for elaboration on how
ecosystem and socioeconomic context matters in this debate.
In practice, both policies have been enacted in the past. The Conservation Reserve Program,
which buys cropland out of production for periods of a decade or more, has been the primary
policy instrument in the United States, with a 2008 budget of about $2 billion. Forestry schemes
in the European Union have sought to convert farmland into deciduous and native woodland.
Extensification-type agro-environmental policies have been more common in the European
Union. Regulation 1257/1997 schemes support such activities as hedgerow restoration,
maximum stocking rates, input use reductions, use of native species, production of organic crops,
as well as rotation, green manure and fallowing practices, where Donald and Evans (2006)
provide a review. These schemes cover about 20 percent of EU farmland at an annual cost of
about€3.5 bilion (Whitfield, 2006). 
The effectiveness of agro-environmental schemes has been brought into question by Kleijn
et al. (2001) and others, especially with respect to a lack of regard for scientific evaluation
(Whitfield, 2006). Many schemes may have had little or even ecologically adverse effects, a
3belief that may have led to cuts in funding for such EU programs. Regarding evaluation, Wätzold
and Schwerdtner (2005) point to a dearth of expertise at the interface of ecology and economics
among those designing and implementing schemes.
Even at the level of academic evaluation, we note in particular that spatial interactions
seldom enter assessment of such schemes despite widespread agreement that land contiguity and
fragmentation are salient in any ecosystem. Recognizing the very decentralized organization of
conservation endeavors and with an eye toward strategic public policy, Albers, Ando, and Chen
(2008) consider spatial interactions between public land in conservation and private land trusts.
In Polasky et al. (2008) and papers cited therein, models with land contiguity effects have been
developed to answer questions about how to arrange conservation and economic activities. The
methods are, however, intended to provide practical assistance to the land manager and to draw
lessons from case study applications. The methods are not as well suited to addressing analytic
questions on land management.
The intent of this article is to go some way toward including spatial effects in economic
analysis of the land use extensification debate. We provide a simple model of a circular
ecosystem that allows for spatially complementary spillovers. Under general conditions we show
that omission of such spillovers may tilt policy toward extensification when intensification might
be optimal. We also show that accommodating spatial spillovers in environmental services can
admit a third alternative, not mentioned in the debate to this point. For identical farms located
around a disc, this is that an environmental buy down policy may best manage these spatial
effects by smoothly varying the provision of environmental services as one moves across space.
The provision would follow a linear combination of a sine and cosine function around the circle.
A land strip topology is also considered, leading to a markedly different optimal landscape
design. We conclude with a brief discussion.
42. MODEL
There are N profit maximizing farms of equal size located on a disc, called the region, with
unit radius. Apart from location, these farms are identical. Land quality, resource availabilities,
and prices are the same, while all farms have a cheese wedge shape with angle 360 / N degrees
and area / N . For agricultural output q , each farm has cost function
(1)
, [0, ];
( )
, .
cq q q
C q
q q
 


Here, 0c and 0q while the market price for output is P c so that all farms produce at q
absent a policy intervention. The government seeks to buy down production in order to provide
environmental services. It is prepared to pay for a production buy down of R output in total, or
an average of / (0, )r R N q   per farm. Given (1), the cost of this buy down is ( )P c R and
does not depend on which farms participate. Producers are indifferent concerning the size of buy
down they choose at auction or are allocated.
For {0,1, ... , 1}n N   as the set of farms enumerated clockwise around the disc, the
government seeks understanding on how best to allocate R over these farms where each farm is
allocated [0, ]nr q
. Environmental benefits are given by 2[ , ( ), ( )] :B r v r r      where
1 2( )nnv N r r

  is the variance of the coordinates drawn from simplex { : [0, ] ,NS r r q  
}nn r R  with [0, ] [0, ] ... [0, ]Nq q q    . Variance is assumed to have domain max[0, ]v ,
max 0v  , where v is maximized on S whenever all but one acre is either producing qor 0.
Benefits depend on r with ( ) / ( ) 0rB r B    . They also depend on v with ( )vB of
unassigned sign.
All other arguments fixed, including the as yet unexplained index , if ( ) 0vB  on its
domain then benefits would be maximized when 0v and nr r n  . This would occur
5under the extensification policy in Green et al. (2005). This variance-is-bad situation could arise
if there were low-hanging fruit to be had from low intrusion agro-environmental schemes,
perhaps requiring slightly wider hedgerows or the use of conservation tillage in the presence of
high cultivation costs. All other arguments fixed, if ( ) 0vB  on its domain then benefits would
be maximized under q-or-0, i.e., all-or-nothing, allocations. This is the other policy arrived at in
Green et al. (2005), intensification. This situation could reflect threshold effects whereby a key
top predator, the wolf, tiger or lynx, will not be tolerated in a neighborhood if even minimal
livestock farming occurs in an area.
The third statistic entering the benefits function is spatial index . This index accounts for
local spatial spillovers in environmental policy and may be viewed as an index of cohesion, i.e.,
an inverse index of fragmentation. It is obtained by viewing the production reduction nr on the
nth farm as providing environmental benefit [ 1] [ 1] [ 1]( , , ) 0.5( )( )n n n n nA r r r r r r r     
[ 1]0.5( )( )n nr r r r  , n, where
(2)
1
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The conditions in (2) are just the modular arithmetic maps required on the disc to ensure that the
0th and 1N  th farms are neighbors. The derivative sign of 2 2[ 1] [ 1]( ) / ( ) /n n n nA r r A r r      
0.5 0 is intended to capture farm-level contiguity effects in the provision of environmental
services. There is local complementarity so that marginal environmental benefits on a given farm
increase with an increase in production buy down on neighboring farms.
Index is obtained from averaging [ 1] [ 1]( , , )n n nA r r r  over the set:
(3) 1 1[ 1] [ 1] [ 1]( ) ( , , ) ( )( ).n n n n nn nr N A r r r N r r r r
 
       
6Note first that ( )r is the lag 1 spatial covariance. The index can have a positive or negative
value and has upper bound ( )v r . To observe how it captures cohesion, let 6N  and 3R
while assuming that the nr must take integer values 0 or 1. Then there are only three distinct
arrangements of the reductions. These are I) {0,0,0,1,1,1} with ( ) 1/3r  , II) {0,0,1,0,1,1} with
( ) 1/3r  , and III) {0,1,0,1,0,1} with ( ) 1r  . We hold that ( ) 0B so as to capture
concerns about the loss in environmental services arising from fragmentation.
We seek to understand the nature of
(4)  arg max , ( ), ( ) .r S B r v r r
Policy options will be characterized as follows:
DEFINITION 1: Extensification is said to be optimal if arg max ( ) 1r S NB r  where 1N is the
vector of 1s in N . Partial intensification is said to be optimal if arg max ( )r S B has one or
more ordinates with values 0 or q.
Intuitively, our interest in partial intensification arises from the fact that if ( ) 0B then a
landscape arrangement involving 0nr  and [ 1]nr q 
or involving nr qand [ 1] 0nr   will
suffer a benefits penalty. If we do not restrict the size of ( )B, and we do not, the penalty may
be large. We will develop on this point in some detail.
3. INDEX PROPERTIES
Note first that ( )r is possessed of strong symmetry properties. In particular for r
0 1 2 2 1( , , , ... , , )
t
N Nr r r r r  , superscript t the transpose operation, write
1
1 2 3 1 0( ) ( , , , ... , , )
t
NL r r r r r r
and in general write [ ] [ 1] [ 2] [ 2] [ 1]( ) ( , , , ... , , )
i t
i i i i iL r r r r r r    where modular arithmetic has been
applied to the subscripts. We say function ( )f x is invariant under rotation if ( ) [ ( )]if x f L x
7for all integers i . Also, write 0 1 2 2 1( ) ( , , , ... , , )
t
N NM r r r r r r  as the vector reflection operation
and we assert that a function ( )f x is invariant under reflection if ( ) [ ( )]f x f M x . Finally with
as the composition operation, function ( )f x is said to be invariant under reflection and
rotation composition if ( ) [ ( )] [ ( )]i if x f M L x f L M x   for all integers i .
PROPERTY 1: Index ( )r is invariant under A) rotation, B) reflection, and consequently C)
reflection and rotation composition.
We turn next to one possibility of gleaning inferences from these symmetries. Uniform
curvature in conjunction with symmetry provides the potential for exploitable structure on level
sets.2 We will see next that any such opportunities will be qualified. Although qualified, we will
show later that such opportunities do exist. The Hessian for the index is given by
(5)
0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
.
0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 



    


This is a circulant matrix in that the second row is obtained from applying a rotation operation on
the first row, the third row is obtained from applying the same operation on the second row and
so on. The eigenvalues of circulant matrices are highly structured, allowing us to obtain:
PROPERTY 2: The index is neither concave nor convex. The eigenvalues of its Hessian matrix are
2cos[2 ( 1) / ] [ 2,2]n n N    , n. They are negative whenever 4 4 3 4N n N    , zero
whenever ( 4) / 4n N  or (3 4) / 4n N  , and positive otherwise.
2 For example, when ( ) :f x   is convex then ( )nn f x is permutation symmetric such
that any transfer 0 to increase ix by and decrease jx by increases the value of the sum
8For 6N  , then 2cos[2 ( 1) / ] { 2, 1,1,2}n N    where some roots are repeated. For N 
9 , then 2cos[2 ( 1) / ] { 1.879, 1,0.347,1.532,2}n N    . While 2 is always an eigenvalue, -2 is
an eigenvalue only when N is even. All other eigenvalues arise twice whenever they arise at all.
The eigenvalue symmetries together with Property 1 suggest that symmetric structure will be
important to the analysis. Property 2 also suggests that trigonometric, or harmonic, analysis
should prove useful in understanding how best to allocate buy downs. Throughout the analysis
we will give content to these speculations.
4. OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
For our first result we fix the values in vector r but allow them to be arranged at will across
the farms. Let ˆ( )T r be the set of all !N rearrangements of vector ˆ Nr r  where, for
convenience in presentation only, we assume the nr are distinct.
PROPOSITION 1: Let ( 1)nr  be the n
th least value of r . When N is
A) even then the arrangement ˆ( )r T r maximizing ( )r is some rotation *,( )i evL r of
(6)  *, (0) (1) (3) ( 3) ( 1) ( 2) (4) (2)ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,tev N N Nr r r r r r r r r    
i an integer, or some rotation of reflection *,( )evM r where the largest value ( 1)Nˆr  in
*,evr is at
farm / 2n N in .
B) odd then the maximizing arrangement is some rotation *,( )i odL r of
(7)  *, (0) (1) (3) ( 2) ( 1) ( 3) (4) (2)ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,tod N N Nr r r r r r r r r    
or some rotation of the reflection *,( )odM r where the largest value ( 1)Nˆr  in
*,odr is at farm n
whenever j ix x .
9( 1) / 2N  in .
COROLLARY 1.1: Solutions to arg max ( )r S B have the spatial arrangement laid out in
Proposition 1.
This corollary tells us that even if the policy maker is restricted to rearrangements of some
ˆr r S  then the optimal solution will be highly symmetric. The optimal vector must be at least
weakly decreasing over half the disc and weakly increasing over the other half. Notice too that
the solutions are entirely ordinal; rank order is all that matters.
We turn now to providing further rationalization of the cohesion index. In the next result, we
do not confine attention to the set ˆ( )r T r but rather let the values be arbitrary on simplex S .
PROPOSITION 2: Consider a transfer ( , ) ( , )i j i jr r r r    , 0 but infinitesimally small, while
n nr r for all n other than i and j. Then ( ) ( )r r  iff [ 1] [ 1] [ 1] [ 1]i i j jr r r r      while ( )v r
( )v r iff i jr r .
COROLLARY 2.1: Environmental services increase under the transfer considered in Proposition 2
A) whenever i) ( ) 0vB  and ii) both of [ 1] [ 1] [ 1] [ 1]i i j jr r r r      and i jr r apply, while they
decrease whenever both inequalities in ii) are reversed.
B) whenever i) ( ) 0vB  and ii) both of [ 1] [ 1] [ 1] [ 1]i i j jr r r r      and i jr r apply, while they
decrease whenever both inequalities in ii) are reversed.
In particular, suppose j ir r  . Then ( , ) ( , )i j j ir r r r so that switching the locations of ir
and jr when both i jr r and [ 1] [ 1] [ 1] [ 1]i i j jr r r r      apply increases the value of the cohesion
index while holding vector mean and variance fixed, implying an increase in environmental
10
benefits. We also note in passing that [ 1] [ 1] [ 1] [ 1]i i j jr r r r      reduces to one of [ 1] [ 1]i jr r  or
[ 1] [ 1]i jr r  when the farms are not adjacent but do have a common neighbor. General condition
[ 1] [ 1] [ 1] [ 1]i i j jr r r r      shows how the index captures the idea of cohesion. Regardless of the ir ,
the cohesion index increases upon a small buy down transfer from jth farm to ith farm if and only
if the farms flanking the latter have an average buy down that is higher than those flanking jr .
Our findings above point to considerable structure on what increases environmental services.
Both propositions 1 and 2 suggest some sort of buy down agglomeration on a segment of the
circle might be best. Concentration is an issue elsewhere in economics, as with income inequality
and market power. There, such statistics as Gini coefficients and variance have been found to be
relevant, where well-known references are Atkinson (1970) and Bergstrom and Varian (1985).
But these statistics do not account for spatial effects and so are inappropriate in our context.
One way of allowing for spatial effects, and also providing opportunities for econometric
study, is to present the chosen buy downs in spectral form. In our case, an additional advantage is
the suitability of harmonic analysis for the circular topology. With 0 {1,2, ... , 1}N   , specify
the spectral sum
(8) 0 0cos(2 / ) sin(2 / ).n k kk kr r a nk N b nk N     
Since 2 2N  orthogonal functions have been used to fit 2N  buy down values, this together
with some constant 0a provides an exact representation of the parameters.
PROPOSITION 3: Let r be represented by a spectral sum with parameters 00{ ( , ), }k ka a b k .
Then 0
2 2( ) 0.5 ( )cos(2 / )k kkr a b k N   and 0 2 2( ) 0.5 ( )k kkv r a b  .
Notice next that cos(2 / )n N is reflexively symmetric around or 0180 in 0n . Thus,
cos(2 / ) cos(2 ( 1) / )N N N   , cos(4 / ) cos(2 ( 2) / )N N N   and so on. For even N there
11
will be a middle entrant in 0 , namely / 2n N . For it, cos(2 / ) 1n N  . For N odd, 0 will
not have a middle entrant. But break the set in two with 0, {1,2, ... ,( 1) / 2}low N   and 0,high
{( 1) / 2,( 3) / 2, ... , 1}N N N    . The intent of what is to follow is to provide exact
conditions under which the mean and variance of production buy downs are held fixed, but the
cohesion index increases.
We will first develop what we call summary coefficients. These account for the degrees of
freedom that the spectral sum allows in fitting the buy down parameters. Drawing from both sets
0,low and 0,high so that cosine evaluations are the same, write the first summary coefficient as
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1N Nc a b a b     and in general the mth coefficient as 2 2 2 2m m m N m N mc a b a b m      
{1,2, ... ,( 1) / 2}N  . For even N , place middle entrant / 2n N in 0,low so that 0,low 
{1,2, ... , / 2}N and 0, {( 2) / 2,( 4) / 2, ... , 1}high N N N     . In this case, and as before, write
the mth summary coefficient as 2 2 2 2 {1,2, ... ,( 2) / 2}m m m N m N mc a b a b m N        . The only
difference when compared with N odd is that 2 2/ 2 / 2 / 2N N Nc a b  .
We are interested in the partial sums of these coefficients. Formally, define
(9)
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
/ 2 / 2
0,
0,
1
{1,2, ... ,( 1) / 2}, odd;
{1,2, ... ,( 2) / 2}, even;
, / 2, even;
{1,2, ... ,( 1) / 2} odd;
{1,2, ... , / 2} even;
, .
m m N m N m
m m m N m N m
N N
low
k low
k ii
a b a b m N N
c a b a b m N N
a b m N N
N N
N N
C c k
 
 

      
      
  
 

 
Bearing in mind that 0a determines the value of r , we have
PROPOSITION 4: Let spectral representations of rand rbe given by 00{ ( , ), }k ka a b k   and
0
0{ ( , ), }k ka a b k   , respectively. Let the summary representations be 0,0{ , }lowka c k   and
0,
0{ , }
low
ka c k   , respectively. Then
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A) r and ( )v r do not change whenever
(10) ( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 20,
/ 2 / 2
odd;
with
even.
N Nlow
k k
N N
C C N
C C k
C C N
       
B) ( ) ( )r r   under condition set (10).
C) Let 0, , { , }lowm mc c m m j k     with 0,, lowj k and j k . If j jc c    and k kc c   
with 0 then ( ) ( )r r   .
COROLLARY 4.1: Environmental services are larger under rthan under rwhere these vectors
are comparable in the sense of (10) above.
COROLLARY 4.2: Among the set of spectral representations given by
(11)   00 2 20 ( , ), : , a constant,k k k kka a b k a b   
the value of ( )r is maximized whenever 2 21 1a b , requiring 0( , ) (0,0) , 1k ka b k k    .
Part A) of the proposition assures that only ( )r is affected. Part B) then leads to Corollary
4.1 in light of the assumption ( ) 0B . Part C) gives deeper insight into Proposition 3. The
loading of variance onto low-frequency harmonics, or cos(2 / )k N where k is low, can be seen
as ensuring a more coherent or smoother manner of variability and so a larger cohesion index. At
the limit we obtain Corollary 4.2.
Corollary 4.2 is very important. It demonstrates part of a discrete version of Wirtinger’s 
inequality, where such demonstration was first provided by different means in Fan, Taussky and
Todd (1955). In our setting this inequality asserts that if [ 1] 1Nr r  and
1
0
( ) 0
N
nn
r r

   then
1 12 2 2
10 0
( ) 4sin ( / ) ( )
N N
n n nn n
r r N r r      . The inequality is satisfied as an equality if and
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only if the nr follow
(12) 1 2cos(2 / ) sin(2 / ),nr r K n N K n N   
where 1K and 2K are free parameters subject to
11 2
0
( )
N
nn
v N r r

  . Since we also know
from Proposition 3 that 2 21 2( ) 0.5 0.5v r K K  , we may write 22 12K v K  . Upon re-labeling
1K K , (12) may be written as
(13)  0.52cos(2 / ) 2 sin(2 / ).nr r K n N v K n N    
With 2 20.5min[ ,( ) ]v r q r  , relation (13) leads us to
PROPOSITION 5: A) Solution (13) is interior on simplex S with variance ( )v r whenever
(14) ( ) ;v r v
B) In that case,
(15) ( ) cos(2 / ) ( ).r N v r 
In some ways, equation (13) should not be all that surprising given the undulation attribute of
the solution to Proposition 1. There of course we confined attention to arrangements of a given
vector.3 Of interest to us is when the path given in (13) emerges as a solution.
DEFINITION 2: Any solution satisfying (13) is said to be harmonic.
Now insert (15) into the benefit function to obtain
(16)  defn( , ) , ,cos(2 / ) .H r v B r v N v
This function is sufficient to describe the optimal solution whenever ( )v r v .
PROPOSITION 6: If
3 Non-spatial models where the idea that identical firms should be treated asymmetrically have
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A) max( , ) 0 [0, ]vH r v v v  then extensification is optimal.
B) ( , ) 0 [0, ]vH r v v v
  then (at least) partial intensification is optimal.
C) ( , )H r v is quasiconcave on max[0, ]v v with an interior maximum on [0, ]v v , then
harmonic solution (13) is optimum.
D) ( , )H r v is quasiconvex on max[0, ]v v with ( ,0) ( , )H r H r v , then (at least) partial
intensification is optimal.
To obtain a better sense of Part C), consider the additively separable form
(17)   1 2 3, ,cos(2 / ) ( ) ( ) ( ),B r v N v B r B v B   
where all of 2 ( ) 0vB v  , 3 ( ) 0B  , and 2 2 3( ) cos (2 / ) ( ) 0vvB v N B   apply on max[0, ]v v :
COROLLARY 6.1: For objective function (17), any interior solution *v to
(18)  2 3( , ) ( ) cos(2 / ) cos(2 / ) 0v vH r v B v N B N v   
is the unique harmonic solution while if
0
( , ) 0v vH r v   then extensification is optimal and if
( , ) 0v v vH r v   then at least partial intensification is optimal.
Notice that the solution to (18) would have * 0v  where the spatial spillovers are ignored.
As cos(2 / ) 0N  when 4N  and as 3 ( ) 0B  , inclusion of spatial effects increases optimal
variance. Ignoring spatial complementarities may tilt the identified optimum toward a lower
variance, or more extensive, policy choice. This has policy implications in light of i) the
tendency to ignore these effects in policy assessments, and ii) previously mentioned concerns
with the effectiveness of implemented agro-environmental schemes.
arisen include works by Salant and Shaffer (1999) and Long and Soubeyran (2001).
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5. BETWEEN CITY AND WILDERNESS
Finally we ask how the production buy downs should be arranged under an alternative
topographical setting. So as to be explicit, suppose that the optimization problem is to choose
r S to maximize
(19)
2
1{1,2, ... , 2}
0 0 1 1
0.5 , 0, 0,
ˆ ˆsubject to , ;
n n n n nn N n n
N N
r r r r
r r r r
       
 
   
 
  
where 2 0   is assumed to ensure concavity. Here the boundary values are to capture
external effects arising from, say, i) a city located on a circle so that no environmental services
are provided and 0 1ˆ ˆ 0Nr r   , or ii) a city at one end of a line, 0ˆ 0r  , and a National Park at the
other end so that 1Nˆr  is large. Parameters n are intended to capture farm-specific benefit
heterogeneities due to locational idiosyncracies, perhaps arising from geographic features such as
rivers, wetlands, or geological formations. These parameters are net of the shadow cost of raising
taxes so no explicit constraint on the sum of buy downs has been included.
The assumption is made that (19) is concave in r . So were n n    on the disc
topology studied to this point then extensification would be optimal. Consequently, there should
be a tendency for the buy downs to be similar across farms in this setting too. This we call the
cohesion force, and the resulting levels of nr will depend on the opportunity cost of tax dollars.
A simple calculation shows that setting /( 2 ) {1,2, ... , 2}nr n N       is optimal whenever
n  for all n and 0 1ˆ ˆ /( 2 )Nr r      . However, there is a second force at play. Low 0ˆr and
1Nˆr  values should tend to depress the values for nr near to the boundaries when compared with
farms near the center of the line. This we call the boundary action force or the edge effect.
The first-order optimality conditions are:4
4 We have used terminology that may bring physical problems to mind. System (20) is an
example of a Sturm-Liouville difference equation. Sturm-Liouville systems are widely
16
(20)
1 1 1 0 2
1 1
2 2 2 3 1
ˆ: 0;
: 0, {2,3, ... , 4, 3};
ˆ: 0.
n n n n n
N N N N N
r r r r
r r r r n N N
r r r r
   
   
   
 
    
   
      
   
Thus, asymmetries arise due to imposed boundary values. The system may be written as
(21)
1 1 0
2 2
3 3
3 3
2 2 1
ˆ1 2 0 0 0
1 2 0 0
0 1 2 0 0 1
;
0 0 0 1 2
ˆ0 0 0 1 2
N N
N N N
r r
r
r
r
r r
  
  
 

 
  
 
  
      
           
          
    
     
          



      


where 2 0     and / 0   . Notice that the roots land h of the characteristic
equation for system (21), 2 (1 2 ) 0x x      , are
(22) 1
1 1
1 (0,1); 1 1; 1 4 (1,1 2 );
2 2l h l l
     
  
            
and are both positive. We have
PROPOSITION 7:A) With 1 11/[ ( )]N Nh l     , the inverse matrix P of the ( 2) ( 2)N N  
matrix in (21) has row i, column j entries
(23)
  
  
1 1
, 1 1
, ;
, .
i i N j j N
h l h l h l
i j j j N i i N
h l h l h l
i j
p
i j
    
    
 
 
    
   
B) The entries are all strictly positive.
C) The entries are all symmetric in that , , , {1,2, ... , 2}i j j ip p i j N    , and furthermore,
centro-symmetric in that , 1 , 1 1 , 1 , {1,2, ... , 2}i j N i N j N j N ip p p i j N        .
D) The entries satisfy the unimodality properties 1, ,i j i jp p i j   , , 1,i j i jp p i j  , , 1i jp 
,i jp i j  , and , 1 ,i j i jp p i j   . This means that 1, jp is decreasing in , {1, ... , 2}j j N  ,
encountered in physics when modeling a variety of phenomena from sound waves to quantum
17
while , 2i Np  is increasing in , {1, ... , 2}i i N  .
E) If N is odd then ( 1) / 2, ( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 2, ( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 2,( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 2,( 1) / 2N k N N k N k N N k N Np p p p k               
{1, ... ,( 3) / 2}N  .
F) If N is odd then ,i ip increases on {1,2, ... ,( 1) / 2}i N  to attain maximum value at i
( 1) / 2N  and decreases on {( 1) / 2,( 1) / 2, ... , 2}i N N N    . If N is even then ,i ip
increases on {1,2, ... ,( 2) / 2}i N  to attain maximum value when at {( 2) / 2, / 2}i N N  and
decreases on { / 2,( 2) / 2, ... , 2}i N N N   .
G) For N odd then ,1 , 2 1,1 1, 2i i N i i Np p p p      on {2,3, ... ,( 1) / 2}i N  and ,1 , 2i i Np p  
1,1 1, 2i i Np p   on  {( 1) / 2,( 3) / 2, ... , 2 }i N N N    . For N even then ,1 , 2 1,1i i N ip p p  
1, 2i Np   on {2,3, ... ,( 2) / 2}i N  and ,1 , 2 1,1 1, 2i i N i i Np p p p      on i
 {( 2) / 2, ... , 2 }N N  , with ,1 , 2 1,1 1, 2i i N i i Np p p p         at / 2i N .
H) With
2
,1
N
i i jj
P p

 , then 2i N iP P  . If N is odd then iP increases on i
{1,2, ... ,( 1) / 2}N  to attain maximum value at ( 1) / 2i N  and decreases on i
{( 1) / 2,( 1) / 2, ... , 2}N N N   . If N is even then iP increases on {1,2, ... ,( 2) / 2}i N  to
attain maximum value when at {( 2) / 2, / 2}i N N  and decreases on i
{ / 2,( 2) / 2, ... , 2}N N N  .
As an example, when 1 and 7N  then the inverted matrix is
mechanics.
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(24)
0.382 0.146 0.056 0.021 0.007
0.146 0.437 0.167 0.062 0.021
.0.056 0.167 0.444 0.167 0.056
0.021 0.062 0.167 0.437 0.146
0.007 0.021 0.056 0.146 0.382
 
 
 
 
 
   
Positivity and symmetry are clearly satisfied while centro-symmetry can be seen from observing
reflections in the off diagonal. Unimodality is confirmed by observing that the largest entry in
any row is on the main diagonal while the entry values decline monotonically as one moves
away from the diagonal along a row. Symmetry ensures that unimodality is true for columns as
well as rows. As 5N  , odd, we can observe a cross pattern around the central entry 3,3p 
0.444 . So 2,3 4,3 3,2 3,4 0.167p p p p    while 1,3 5,3 3,1 3,5 0.056p p p p    . As for row
sums, they are 1 5 2 4 30.612 0.833 0.89P P P P P       . That F) applies in this case can be
seen from unimodality along the main diagonal.
We have also from the proposition that sensitivity to edge values decreases with
displacement and that, all else equal, edge values can create a variety of optimal buy down
arrangements.
COROLLARY 7.1: 2 0 0 1 0ˆ ˆ ˆ0 / ... / ... /N ndr dr dr dr dr dr     and 2 1 0ˆ ˆ/ ... / ...N N ndr dr dr dr    
1 0ˆ/ 0dr dr  .
COROLLARY 7.2: Suppose that {1,2, ... , 2}i i N    .
A) For 0 1ˆ ˆ /Nr r   then nr forms a U shape. That is, nr decreases in n for small n, reaches
a minimum and increases in n for large n.
B) For 0 1ˆ ˆ /Nr r   then nr forms an inverted U shape. That is, nr increases in n for small n,
reaches a maximum and decreases in n for large n.
C) For 0ˆ /r  and 1ˆ /Nr  then nr is monotone increasing.
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D) For 0ˆ /r  and 1ˆ /Nr  then nr is monotone decreasing.
The proposition’s economic content is best ilustrated through the corolaries. Corolary 7.1 
shows how the complementary spillovers diminish over space. All else equal, a nature reserve at
one end of a strip should encourage relatively large buy downs over neighboring farms when
compared with more distant farms. Parts A) and B) of Corollary 7.2 identify two opposing
forces. For low values of 0ˆr and 1Nˆr  , as when there are cities at both ends of a strip, then buy
downs should rise when moving from the edges toward the center. This is just as viscous fluids
dip toward the sides of a glass. The reverse is true for high values of 0ˆr and 1Nˆr  . When the edges
are wilderness, then buy downs should taper off so that the most intensively farmed land lies at
the center of the strip.
6. DISCUSSION
Working with a simple spatial model on a disc, this paper has sought to clarify some issues
in agri-environmental policy. For farms identical in all ways, we find it may be optimal to treat
them asymmetrically in order to avoid loss in ecosystem services due to fragmentation. In doing
so, a trade-off can arise if eco-service benefits on any given farm are concave. This trade-off
leads to the possibility of a third policy option, one not considered in the formal literature to this
point. A smoothly varying buy down policy around the disc may be best, where we find a closed-
form trigonometric solution for the optimal policy.
We also allow for farm-level heterogeneities in the provision of eco-services. In order to
better understand the implications of topological structure, we do so for a strip of land rather than
for a closed disc. While the setting is very different, spatial spillovers lead to a preference for
smooth variation in this situation too. If the boundaries are wilderness and the land between is
homogeneous then the buy downs should largely be near the bounds and will decrease steeply
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toward the center whenever the opportunity cost of tax funds is high. If the bounds are urban and
the opportunity cost of tax funds is low then the buy downs will be at the center of the land strip.
Beyond the problem at hand, we see other uses for our approach. One is to better understand
spatial effects within city residency patterns where positive neighborhood spillovers can be seen
in equilibria that involve family wealth gradients. Somewhat more abstractly, parents worry
about the friends children keep, perhaps in part arising from beliefs about behavioral norms, peer
effects, and mutual re-enforcement. Public health studies lend credence to these concerns. For
example, Christakis and Fowler (2007) have identified social effects in the propensity to become
obese where these effects are not entirely explained by the endogenous formation of social ties
by people of different body mass indices. If a group of individuals are arranged in a circle and
each person is viewed as being friends of just the contiguous neighbors on either side, then our
model may be able to say something about equilibrium behavior concerning diet, social
deviancy, and personal discipline.
APPENDIX: OMITTED PROOFS
PROOF OF PROPERTY 1:
Since 1 2[ 1]( ) n nnr N r r r

  and r is invariant to reflection, rotation or their
composition, we need only consider the effect on [ 1]( ) n nnr r r  . For part A), note that
[ 1] [ 1 ] [ ]n n n i n in n
r r r r i      . Parts B) and C) follow from
(A1)
0 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 0
1 0 2 1 1 1 2 0 1
[ 1 ] [0 ] [ 2 ] [ 1 ] [ ] [ 1] [1 ] [2 ] [0 ] [1 ]
... ...
... ...
... ... ;
n n N N N
N N N N n N n
N i i N i N i N n i N n i i i i i
r r r r r r r r r r
r r r r r r r r r r
r r r r r r r r r r
   
    
         
     
      
      
i.e., impose reflection and composition permutations on the arguments of ( )r . 
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PROOF OF PROPERTY 2:
Eqn. (3.1.5’) on p. 68 and eqn. (3.2.6) on p. 73 in Davis (1994) provide the eigenvalue
formula for circulant matrices
(A2)   cos[2 ( 1) / ] 1 sin[2 ( 1) / ] ,j nn c n j N n j N       
where 0 1 1( , , ... , )Nc c c  is the first row of the matrix. In our case, for eqn. (5), 1 1 1Nc c   and
all other entries are zero so that
(A3)
 
 
cos[2 ( 1) / ] 1 sin[2 ( 1) / ]
cos[2 ( 1)( 1) / ] 1 sin[2 ( 1)( 1) / ]
2cos[2 ( 1) / ],
j j N j N
N j N N j N
j N
  
 

    
      
 
as cos[2 ( 1) / ] cos[2 ( 1)( 1) / ]j N N j N     and sin[2 ( 1) / ]j N  
sin[2 ( 1)( 1) / ]N j N   . The other statements follow from cosine function properties. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
Theorem 10 in Chao and Liang (1992) shows that  *, ˆ( ) [ 1]minev r T r n nnr f r r   when
N is even and  *, ˆ( ) [ 1]minod r T r n nnr f r r   for ( ) :f    a convex function and 
the absolute value function. Let 2( )f x x and note that  2 2[ 1] 2n n nn nr r r   
[ 1]2 n nn r r  . Since 2nn r is invariant for ˆ( )r T r , it follows that these vectors must
maximize ( )r over domain ˆ( )r T r . 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1.1:
Rearrangements of any r do not affect r or ( )v r , while ( ) 0B . So the optimal r in
some set ˆ( )T r will be the one maximizing ( )r . As it is true of any vector, it is true of
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 arg max ( )r ST B  . 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
Again, we need only consider the effect on [ 1]( ) n nnr r r  . There are two cases: either
the ith and jth farms are adjacent or they are not. Suppose they are adjacent, or [ 1]j i  where
symmetry ensures that consideration of [ 1]j i  is identical. Then
(A4)
0 1 [ 1] [ 1] [ 1] [ 2] 1 0
2
[ 1] [ 1] [ 2]
( ) ... ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ...
( ) ,
i i i i i i N
i i i i
r r r r r r r r r r r
r r r r r
    
     
    
  
          
     

with derivative [ 1] [ 1] [ 2]0( ) / i i i ir r r r r          where [ 1]i j  and [ 2] [ 1]i j   .
Suppose instead the farms are not adjacent. Then
(A5) [ 1] [ 1] [ 1] [ 1]( ) ( ) ,i i j jr r r r r r            
with derivative [ 1] [ 1] [ 1] [ 1]0( ) / i i j jr r r r r           .
As for variance, r does not change so we need only consider the effect on the sum of
squares. The expression
(A6) 2 2 2 20 1... ( ) ... ( ) ...i j Nr r r r         
has derivative 2 2i jr r when 0 . 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2.1:
This follows from the assumed sign on ( )vB in addition to ( ) 0B . 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
Insert (8) into (3) and expand to obtain
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(A7)
0 0
0 0
0 0
0
1
1
1
1
( ) cos(2 / ) cos(2 ( 1) / )
cos(2 / ) sin(2 ( 1) / )
sin(2 / ) cos(2 ( 1) / )
sin(2 / ) sin(2 ( 1) / )
k kn k k
k kn k k
k kn k k
k kk k
r N a nk N a n k N
N a nk N b n k N
N b nk N a n k N
N b nk N b n k N
  
 
 
 

  

  

  


   
   
   
 
  
  
  
0 .n    
Consider each of these four right-hand terms in turn. For the first, use
(A8) cos(2 ( 1) / ) cos(2 / )cos(2 / ) sin(2 / )sin(2 / ),n k N nk N k N nk N k N      
to write
(A9)
0 0
0 0
0 0
cos(2 / ) cos(2 ( 1) / )
cos(2 / ) cos(2 / )cos(2 / )
cos(2 / ) sin(2 / )sin(2 / ) .
k ln k l
k ln k l
k ln k l
a nk N a n l N
a nk N a nl N l N
a nk N a nl N l N
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
   
  
  
  
But multiplication of the first inner product of sums and then use of the orthogonality property
(A10) cos(2 / )cos(2 / ) 0 for and integers,
n
nk N nl N k l k   
on the sum over n leads to
(A11)
0 0
0
0
2 2
2 2
cos(2 / ) cos(2 / )cos(2 / )
cos (2 / )cos(2 / )
cos(2 / ) cos (2 / ).
N
k ln k l
kn k
kk n
a nk N a nl N l N
a nk N k N
a k N nk N
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
   

  
 
 
Multiply out the remaining inner product of sums in (A9) and apply orthogonality property
(A12) cos(2 / )sin(2 / ) 0 for and integers,
n
nk N nl N k l  
to confirm
(A13) 0 0cos(2 / ) sin(2 / )sin(2 / ) 0k ln k la nk N a nl N l N        
so that
(A14)
0 0
0 0
2 2 2
cos(2 / ) cos(2 ( 1) / )
cos(2 / ) cos (2 / ) 0.5 cos(2 / ),
N
k ln k l
k kk n k
a nk N a n l N
a k N nk N N a k N
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
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where 2cos (2 / ) 0.5 3
Nn
nk N N N    simplifies. With the additional use of
(A15)
2
sin(2 ( 1) / ) sin(2 / )cos(2 / ) sin(2 / )cos(2 / );
sin(2 / )sin(2 / ) 0 for and integers;
sin (2 / ) 0.5 3,
N
n
n
n k N nk N k N k N nk N
nk N nl N k l k
nk N N N
    
 



  
 
  


it can be shown that
(A16)
0 0
0
0 0
0
0 0
cos(2 / ) sin(2 ( 1) / )
0.5 sin(2 / );
sin(2 / ) cos(2 ( 1) / )
0.5 sin(2 / );
sin(2 / ) sin(2 ( 1) / )
0.5
N
k kn k k
k kk
k kn k k
k kk
k kn k k
a nk N b n k N
N a b k N
b nk N a n k N
N a b k N
b nk N b n k N
 

 

 
  

  

  
  

  

  

  

  

  
0
2cos(2 / ).kkN b k N
The sum in (A7) therefore resolves to
(A17)  0 2 2( ) 0.5 cos(2 / ).k kkr a b k N  
As for variance, insert (8) into the expression for variance to obtain
(A18)
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1
1
1
1
( ) cos(2 / ) cos(2 / )
cos(2 / ) sin(2 / )
sin(2 / ) cos(2 / )
sin(2 / ) sin(2 / ) .
k kn k k
k kn k k
k kn k k
k kn k k
v r N a nk N a nk N
N a nk N b nk N
N b nk N a nk N
N b nk N b nk N
 
 
 
 

  

  

  

  
   
   
   
   
  
  
  
  
The orthogonality conditions laid out above, i.e., where the sum of a product equals 0, readily
leads to 0
2 2( ) 0.5 ( )k kkv r a b  . 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
Part A): For mean, it is readily shown that cos(2 / ) sin(2 / ) 0
n n
n N n N     so that
nn
r N r  regardless of how values of the spectral sum coefficients are rearranged. On
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variance, 0
2 2( ) 0.5 ( )k kkv r a b  in Proposition 3 may be viewed in terms of partial sums. The
condition that ( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 2N NC C   when N is odd and / 2 / 2N NC C  when N is even ensures that
variance is held fixed.
Part B): Use Proposition 3 and summation by parts to write
(A19)    
 
0,
1 2 ( 1) / 2
1 2
3 ( 1) / 2
( ) 0.5 cos(2 / )
0.5 cos(2 / ) 0.5 cos(4 / ) ... 0.5 cos( ( 1) / )
0.5 cos(2 / ) cos(4 / ) 0.5 cos(4 / ) cos(6 / )
0.5 cos(6 / ) cos(8 / ) ... 0.5 cos( ( 1) / ),
low kk
N
N
r c k N
c N c N c N N
C N N C N N
C N N C N N
 
  
   
  




    
   
    

when N is odd and replace the last term by / 2 / 20.5 cos( / ) 0.5N NC N N C  when N is even. If
buy down vectors rand rare represented by vectors cand c, respectively, then
(A20)
  
     
 
1 1
2 2 3 3
( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 2
0 0
0 00 0
0
( ) ( ) 0.5 cos(2 / ) cos(4 / )
0.5 cos(4 / ) cos(6 / ) 0.5 cos(6 / ) cos(8 / )
... 0.5 N N
r r C C N N
C C N N C C N N
C C
   
   
 
 
  

      
        
   

  
 0
cos( ( 1) / )N N



when N is odd and replace the last term by / 2 / 2 / 2 / 20.5( )cos( ) 0.5( )N N N NC C C C      when
N is even. Clearly, condition set (10) together with cos( )x decreasing on (0, )x  ensure that
( ) ( )r r   .
Part C): The transfers in question ensure satisfaction of condition set (10). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
Part A): We seek the extremes on (13) to establish when a K exists such that the nr are in
the interior of S given variance value v . Differentiate (12) and set equal zero as the necessary
condition for a maximum or minimum:
(A21) 1 2sin(2 / ) cos(2 / ) 0;K n N K n N   
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with solution set * [0, )n N where the solutions need not be in . Re-write as
(A22)  * -1 2 1tan / .2
N
n K K


Consideration of the shape of the inverse tangent function shows that there are two solutions
on * [0, )n N . Furthermore, trigonometric periodicity ensures that 1sin(2 / )K n N 
   2 1 2cos(2 / ) sin (2 ) / cos (2 ) /K n N K n N N K n N N      , implying that the two solutions
are radians apart. Since (12) is continuous in n , one of the solutions must be the unique
maximum and the other must be the unique minimum. So any candidate optima satisfy
(A23)    -1 -11 2 1 2 2 1cos tan / sin tan / .nr r K K K K K K        
Now
(A24)    -1 -11 22 1 2 12 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
cos tan / ; sin tan / ;
K K
K K K K
K K K K
        
where the signs must match. Consequently the knowledge 2 21 2( ) 0.5 0.5v r K K  provides
(A25) 2 21 2 2 ( )nr r K K v r   
as maximum and minimum. Thus for interior solutions on S we need 0 2 ( )r v r  and
2 ( )r v r q , or
(A26) 2 2( ) 0.5min ,( ) ;v r r q r v    

Part B): Use Wirtinger’s inequality and specification (12) to re-write 1 210 ( )
N
n nn
r r

  
12 2
0
4sin ( / ) ( )
N
nn
N r r   as 1 12 2[ 1]0 02 2 4sin ( / )N Nn n nn nr r r N Nv      or  1 2 20N nn r r  
 1 2 2[ 1]0 2sin ( / )N n nn r r r N Nv    or 22sin ( / )Nv N N Nv   or
(A27) 22sin ( / ) cos(2 / ) ,v N v N v    
as 2cos(2 / ) 1 2sin ( / )N N  . 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6:
Part A): Clearly, setting 0v maximizes the value of ( , )H r v on max[0, ]v v .
Part B): Setting v v maximizes the value of ( , )H r v on [0, ]v v . The only solutions
that have not been ruled out involve at least partial intensification.
Part C): Quasiconcavity rules out a solution on max( , ]v v v given an interior maximum on
[0, ]v v .
Part D) Quasiconvexity with ( ,0) ( , )H r H r v ensures that the solution is in max[ , ]v v
while all solutions on max[ , ]v v v must involve at least partial intensification. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7:
Part A): This is an adaptation of Remark 2, p. 110, in Yamamoto and Ikebe (1979). Note,
from (22) that 1h l , so that (23) can be rewritten as:
(A28)
  
  
1 1
, 1 1
, ;
, .
i i N j N j
h l h l
i j j j N i N i
h l h l
i j
p
i j
   
   
 
 
    
   
Part B): Since 0 and 1 1N Nh l   , therefore 0 . Since , 0, 0h l i j    , and
1 0N i , 1 0N j  for all , {1, ... , 2}i j N  , it immediately follows that all terms in
parentheses in (A28) are strictly positive, proving the assertion.
Part C): For symmetry, arbitrarily assume that i j . Using (A28), ,i jp and ,j ip are:
(A29)
  
  
1 1
,
1 1
,
, ;
, .
a a N b N b
a b h l h l
a a N b N b
b a h l h l
p a b
p b a
   
   
 
 
    
    
Centro-symmetry follows from inspection of (A28); e.g., i j implies 1 1N i N j  so
that 1 1, ( )( )
i i N j N j
i j h l h lp        and
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(A30)
      
  
1 1 1 11 1
1 , 1
1 1
, .
N N i N N iN j N j
N i N j h l h l
N j N j i i
h l h l i j
p
p
   
   
    
 
 
  
   
Part D): This is also immediate from inspection of (A28). For i j , and 11h l h     then
the top line of (A28) is increasing in i, whereas the bottom line is decreasing in i, implying that
,i jp is increasing in i for i j and ,i jp is decreasing in i for i j , thus proving the conjecture.
The second part of the statement, how ,i jp varies with j, follows from the symmetry , ,i j j ip p in
part C).
Part E): Note from centro-symmetry in part C) that ( 2) / 2, ( 2) / 2, 1N j N N jp p   . Then set j
( 1) / 2k N  so that ( 2) / 2, ( 1) / 2 ( 2) / 2, 1 ( 1) / 2 ( 2) / 2,( 1) / 2N k N N N N k N N kp p p           .
Part F): From (A28),
(A31)      1 1 1 1, .i i N i N i i i N i N ii i h l h l h h h hp                   
Specifying 1, 1 ,i i i i ip p   , it follows that
(A32)
     
 
        
1 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 2 3 2 1
1 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 4 4 21 1 1 1 .
i i N i N i i i N i N i
i h h h h h h h h
N N i N i N N N i N i N
h h h h h h h h
N i N i N i i N
h h h h h h h
       
       
      
        
           
    
      
        
       
Since 1h , i has the sign of 2 4 4N i  , i.e., 0i if and only if ( 2) / 2i N  . For i even
and ( / 2) 1i N  then ,i ip is increasing in i when i i , , 1, 1i i i ip p    , and ,i ip is decreasing in
i when i i . For i odd and ( 1) / 2i N  , ,i ip increases when ,i i reaches a maximum at
i i and decreases when i i .
Part G): This requires writing out the relevant terms,
(A33)
 
         
1 1
,1
1 2 1 2
, 2
( ) ;
.
N i N i
i h l h l
N N N Ni i i i
i N h l h l h l h l
p
p
   
       
 
   

  
     
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Thus we may define
(A34)    1 1,1 , 2 .N i N i i ii i N h l h l h lA p p                
Similarly, with
(A35)
     
   
1 1
1,1 1, 2
1 1
1,1 1, 2
; ;
;
N i N i i i
i h l h l i N h l h l
N i N i i i
i i N h l h l h l
p p
B p p
       
     
   
  
   
  
     
        
then
(A36)
 
     
          
   
,1 , 2 1,1 1, 2
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
( )
1 1 1 1
1
A i i N i i N
N i N i i i N i N i i i
h l h l h l h l h l
N i N i i i
h l h h l l h h l l
N i N i i i
h l h h l h h l
i A B p p p p
         
         
       
   
     
   
    
            
          
          
       1 ,h  
where 1(1 ) ( 1)l h h     has been used. Factorize further to obtain
(A37)
   
     
     
1 1
1 1 1
1 2
( ) ( 1)
( 1) 1 1
( 1) 1 1 .
N i N i i i
A h l h h h h h
i N i N
h l h h h h h
N i i N
h l h h h h
i       
      
     
    
    
  
         
       
    
For N even, let / 2i N . Then ( )A i is negative on i i and positive on i i , implying
,1 , 2 1,1 1, 2i i N i i Np p p p      on {2,3, ... ,( / 2) 1}i N  , ,1 , 2 1,1 1, 2i i N i i Np p p p      when i
/ 2N and ,1 , 2 1,1 1, 2i i N i i Np p p p      on {( / 2) 1, ... , 2}i N N   . For N odd, the same
reasoning implies ,1 , 2 1,1 1, 2i i N i i Np p p p      on {2,3, ... ,( 1) / 2}i N  , and ,1 , 2i i Np p  
1,1 1, 2i i Np p   on {( 1) / 2, ... , 2}i N N   .
Part H): From part C), , 2 , 2i j N i N jp p   . Sum each over j to conclude that 2i N iP P  .
Rewrite (21) in the text as:
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(A38)
1 1 0
2 2
3 3
3 3
2 2 1
1 2 0 0 0
1 2 0 0
0 1 2 0 0
; ;
0 0 0 1 2
0 0 0 1 2
ˆ
1
; .
ˆ
N N
N N N
r r
r
r
r
r r
 
  
 
 
 
 




 
 
  
  
    
    
 
  
   
   
   
   
   
    
   
   
      
Γr b Γ
r b



     


 
By definition, ,i jp is the element in the i
th row and jth column of -1Γ . By definition:
(A39)
1
2
3
2
1
1
where .
1
1
N
N
P
P
P
P


  
  
  
   
  
     
-1ΓU U 
Also,
(A40)
1
1 0
where .
1 0
1
 
 
  
  
  
    
  
      
ΓU U+Ε E 
Thus:
(A41)   .    -1 -1 -1U ΓΓU Γ U E P ΓE
Now pick off the ith row in U and write it as iU . From (A41) it is 1i iU P  
,1 , 2( )i i Np p  . Since part B) of the proposition has , 0i jp  , therefore
(A42)  ,1 , 21 1i i i NP p p    .
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Hence:
(A43)      1 1,1 1, 2 ,1 , 2 1,1 1, 2 ,1 , 2 .i i i i N i i N i i N i i NP P p p p p p p p p                 
From part G) of the proposition, if N is odd, the expression on the right-hand side of (A43) is
positive for {2,3, ... ,( 1) / 2}i N  and negative for {( 1) / 2, ... , 2}i N N   , implying iP
increases for ( 1) / 2i N  , attains its maximum at ( 1) / 2i N  and decreases thereafter.
Similarly, for N even, the expression on the right-hand side of (A43) is positive for i
{2,3, ... ,( / 2) 1}N  , zero when / 2i N and negative for {( / 2) 1, ... , 2}i N N   , implying iP
increases for ( 2) / 2i N  , reaches a maximum at ( 2) / 2 / 2N NP P  , and decreases thereafter. 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 7.1: From (21) and (23), 0 ,1ˆ/ /n ndr dr p  . Parts D) and C) of the
proposition have that ,1 1,n np p is decreasing in the value of n . Similarly, 1ˆ/n Ndr dr  
, 2 /n Np  while parts D) and C) have that , 2 2,n N N np p  is increasing in the value of n . 
PROOF OF COROLLARY 7.2: From inverting (21) in the text we can write
(A44)  ,1 0 , 2 1 ,1 0 , 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,i i i i N N i i N Nr P p r p r p r p r         
                   
where, in (A44), we use the result from the proof of part H), Proposition 7, that:
(A45)  ,1 , 21 ; / .i i i NP p p      
Part A): For 0 1ˆ ˆ /Nr r   , (A44) becomes:
(A46)  0 ,1 , 2ˆ .i i i Nr r p p   
      
Since part G) of Proposition 7 establishes that the sequence ,1 , 2i i Np p  is U-shaped, with
minimum in the middle of the interval {1, ... , 2}N  , and since 0 1ˆ ˆ /Nr r   , it immediately
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follows from (A46) that the sequence ir is also U-shaped with minr  .
Part B): The logic is the same as part A), except that since 0ˆ / 0r   , the sequence ir
forms an inverted U, with maximum maxr  in the middle of the interval, and relative minima
at the end points.
Part C): Note that, from Proposition 7, part D), ,1ip is monotonically decreasing in i and that
, 2i Np  is monotonically increasing in i. Thus, for 0 1ˆ ˆ0 /Nr r    , it follows that
   ,1 0 , 2 1ˆ ˆ/ /i i N Np r p r     is monotonically increasing in i, proving the assertion.
Part D): Proof of D) is identical to C), except that since 0 1ˆ ˆ/ 0 /Nr r     ,
   ,1 0 , 2 1ˆ ˆ/ /i i N Np r p r     - and hence ir - is monotone decreasing in i. 
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